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 Abstract  
Social distancing has emerged as the primary mitigation strategy to combat the 
COVID-19 pandemic in the United States. However, large-scale evaluation of the 
public’s response to social distancing campaigns has been lacking. We used 
anonymized and aggregated mobility data from Google Location History users to 
estimate the impact of social distancing recommendations on bulk mobility among users 
who have opted into this service. We found that state-of-emergency declarations 
resulted in a ~10% reduction in time spent away from places of residence. 
Implementation of one or more social distancing policies resulted in an additional 25% 
reduction in mobility the following week. Subsequent shelter-in-place mandates 
provided an additional 29% reduction. Our findings provide evidence that state-wide 
mandates are effective in promoting social distancing within this study group. 
 
  
 
 
   
 Main Text  
Social distancing has emerged as the primary strategy for slowing the spread of the 
COVID-19 pandemic. Social distancing is expected to reduce the frequency of close 
contact with others and thus minimize the transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus. 
Prior experience with the 2009 H1N1 influenza and Ebola suggests that social 
distancing is effective in reducing disease transmission.(1, 2) 
  
In China, officials engaged in an unprecedented quarantine of Hubei province to contain 
COVID-19 transmission out of the initial epicenter city of Wuhan.(3-5) As the pandemic 
spread to new clusters of infection in the United States (U.S.) efforts at containment and 
then mitigation have been largely at the discretion of state and local governments, 
leading to a patchwork of directives to encourage social distancing. These policies have 
included state emergency declarations, work-from-home policies, school closures, 
closures of non-essential businesses and services, limits placed on large social 
gatherings, bans on in-restaurant service, and shelter-in-place orders.(6) To date, there 
is some limited data that these policies may be working. Several news outlets have 
shown substantial drops in mobility across the nation since early March, although the 
ties to specific policy interventions are less clear. Given the current reliance on social 
distancing policies to limit the spread of COVID-19, systematically quantifying the 
impact of these policies on mobility may be helpful to public health officials. 
 
The availability of anonymized and aggregated mobility data represents a novel 
opportunity to quantify the effectiveness of individual social distancing interventions.(7) 
We used aggregated (anonymized with differential privacy) data from Google users 
across the U.S. who have opted-in to Location History (the Location History feature is 
off by default and requires explicit opt-in).(8,9)  Using these data, information on the 
dates of implementation of various social distancing policies (see Supplemental 
Material), and a regression discontinuity approach, we sought to: 1) quantify the 
average effect on mobility of declarations of states of emergency, social distancing 
policies, and shelter-in-place orders, and 2) gain insights into which policies are most 
effective in promoting social distancing. Our primary outcome of interest is the relative 
change in the time spent away from places of residence, and also considered relative 
changes in the number of visits to places of work and the number of visits to: 1) grocery 
stores and pharmacies, 2) retail, recreation, and eateries), 3) parks, and 4) transit stops.  
 
Overall, we observed three waves of state-level responses to COVID-19: 1) a first wave 
occurring during the first two weeks of March with state of emergency declarations, 2) a 
 second wave during the week of March 16 where a variety of specific social distancing 
orders were implemented, and 3) a third wave during the last two weeks of March 
consisting of orders for residents to shelter in place orders (​Figure 1​).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:​ Implementation of state-level policies in response to COVID-19, ordered by date of first social 
distancing policy. Although policies implemented through April 5, 2020 are shown, only effects of policies 
implemented through March 23, 2020 were evaluated.  
 
The first state of emergency related to COVID-19 was declared by Washington State on 
February 29, and most recently by Oklahoma and Maine on March 15. Many states 
subsequently ordered that schools close (led by Louisiana and Virginia on March 13, 
2020), and/or placed limits on specific activities and businesses in order to promote 
social distancing. Within a week, 48 states and Washington DC had implemented at 
least 1 social distancing policy.  In 78% of states, the first social distancing order 
imposed was the closure of schools. On March 16, Nevada enacted orders advising 
residents to shelter in place, followed by California on March 19, 2020. As of April 5, 
80% of states had ordered residents to shelter in place.  
 
We used the same data that was used to prepare the Community Mobility Reports 
published by Google (8,9) to compute aggregated visit trends to a number of specific 
categories of locations (see Supplemental Material). Trends were aggregated to the 
 county level (including Washington, DC and independent cities that are not otherwise 
included in county boundaries), and available daily from January 1 through March 29, 
2020. Within each county we applied a regression discontinuity analysis to estimate the 
relative change in the amount of time spent away from places of residence of Location 
History users and the relative change in the number of visits to specific categories of 
locations in the week after versus before each intervention. The following results should 
be interpreted in light of several important limitations including that our data are limited 
to Google users who have opted in to Location History. 
 
      
Figure 2:​ ​(A)​ Average effect on mobility of state-wide emergency declaration orders. ​(B)​ Average effect 
on mobility of implementation of first state-wide social distancing (SD) policy in 49 states and Washington 
DC. Idaho is not included in this figure because its first social distancing order was after March 23rd. ​(C) 
Average effect of shelter in place (SIP) order among 7 states that had issued such an order on or before 
March 23, 2020 and, for comparison, among the other states over a comparable time period. Note that 
comparisons across states are only descriptive and cannot be interpreted as reflecting a causal effect. 
 
On average across the country, a declaration of a state of emergency was associated 
with a 9.9% (95% confidence interval [CI]: -10.1%, -9.7%) decrease in time spent away 
from places of residence, 11.4% (95% CI: -11.8%, -11.0%) fewer visits to the 
workplace, 11.5% (-11.7%, -11.2%) fewer visits to retail outlets and recreational sites, 
and 9.3% fewer visits to transit stops (-9.6%, -9.0%) in the following week (​Figure 2A​). 
These changes in mobility are noteworthy given that emergency declarations did not 
necessarily specifically call for increased social distancing and suggests that 
government messaging, news coverage, and/or actions observed in other countries 
could have influenced people’s activities. Visits to parks were also affected by 
 emergency declarations, with a small 3.5% (95% CI: -4.4%, -2.6%) average reduction. 
The smaller impact of emergency declarations on visits to parks versus other venues is 
likely at least partly explained by the warmer weather and transition to spring during this 
period. On the other hand, emergency declarations coincided with a relative ​increase​ in 
visits to grocery stores and pharmacies of 8.2% (95% CI: 7.9%, 8.5%), consistent with 
news reports of individuals stocking up on dry goods, cleaning supplies, and 
medications at the end of February and early March in anticipation of impending social 
distancing orders.(10)  
  
We next examined the impact on mobility of the first social distancing policies 
implemented in each state. We found that on average across the country these orders 
resulted in additional reductions in mobility above and beyond the changes observed 
following emergency declarations (​Figure 2B​).  Specifically, implementation of one or 
more social distancing policies resulted in a further 24.5% (95% CI: -24.7%, -24.3%) 
reduction in time spent away from places of residence, a further 33.0% (-33.3%, 
-32.8%) reduction in visits to retail and recreational outlets, and a further 27.9% 
(-28.3%, -27.5%) reduction in visits to work in the following week. The same pattern was 
evident for visits to parks, and for visits to grocery stores and pharmacies.  
 
 
Figure 3:​ Effect of the first social distancing order on time spent away from places of residence by state. 
Color coding reflects the number of social distancing policies that were enacted in each state. Outliers not 
shown.  
 
The impacts of social distancing orders varied substantially between states (​Figure 3​). 
For example, implementation of social distancing policies was associated with a 36% 
decrease in the time spent away from places of residence in New Jersey versus a 12% 
decrease in Louisiana, but we note that differences in mobility between states may be 
due to a number of factors beyond social distancing policies. The median of 
state-specific changes in time spent away from places of residence was a decrease of 
 19%.  States that enacted multiple social distancing measures tended to experience 
greater reductions in mobility. The impact of social distancing orders also varied 
substantially across counties within each state regardless of the average impact across 
the state (​Supplemental Table 1​).  Results were consistent when considering changes 
in visits to work, visits to grocery stores and pharmacies, visits to retail, recreation, and 
eateries, visits to parks, and visits to transit stops (​Supplemental Figure 1​). 
 
We next considered the impact on mobility of state-wide orders to shelter in place. 
Among the 7 states that had issued shelter in place orders on or before March 23, we 
found substantial reductions in time spent away from places of residence and in visits to 
all categories of locations (​Figure 2C​). Specifically, time spent away from places of 
residence was 29.0% (95% CI: -29.4%, -28.5%) lower in the week following 
implementation of shelter in place orders versus the prior week. Note that these 
changes are multiplicative over time as all states had already declared a state of 
emergency and implemented at least one social distancing policy. For comparison, we 
also show in Figure 2C the change in mobility during the same time frame (March 23-29 
versus March 14-20, 2020) among those states that had not yet issued shelter-in-place 
orders by March 23. However, note that comparisons between states reflect the 
influence of a number of factors on mobility in addition to policy differences.  
 
Given that most states enacted multiple policies to encourage social distancing over a 
short time period, it is not possible to estimate the independent effects of individual 
policies. However, in secondary analyses we sought to identify the combinations of 
social distancing orders that were associated with greater changes in mobility (​Figure 
4​). Among states that initially implemented a single social distancing order, the most 
effective single order was imposing limits on bar and restaurant operations, which was 
associated with a 25.8% reduction (95% CI: -26.3%, -25.3%) in time spent away from 
places of residence. The smallest reductions in time spent away from places of 
residence were observed in those states that only imposed state-mandated school 
closures and/or bans on large gatherings, suggesting that bar and restaurant limits and 
orders calling for the closure of non-essential businesses are needed to further reduce 
mobility.  
 
  
 
Figure 4: ​Association between different combinations of first social distancing orders on average time 
spent away from places of residence. Note that only two combinations of measures are observed in more 
than 3 states. Abbreviations: ​LGB​ = Large Gathering Ban, ​SMSC​ = State Mandated School Closures, 
B&RL​ = Bar & Restaurant Limits, ​NBC​ = Nonessential Business Closures. 
 
 
These results should be interpreted in light of several important limitations. First, our 
source data are limited to smartphone users who have opted in to Google’s consumer 
Location History feature. These data may not be representative of the population as 
whole, and furthermore their representativeness may vary by location. Additionally, 
these limited data are only viewed through the lens of differential privacy algorithms, 
specifically designed to protect user anonymity and obscure fine detail (8). Moreover, 
comparisons across rather than within locations are only descriptive since these regions 
can differ in substantial ways besides the policy environment. Second, our analyses are 
focused on state-level policies, whereas individual metropolitan areas and counties 
within a state may have implemented specific social distancing policies prior to 
implementation of state-level policies (see ​Supplemental Figure 4 ​for detailed 
examples from King County, WA, Westchester County, NY, New York County, NY, and 
Santa Clara County, CA). Third, we did not assess the impact of social distancing 
policies or resulting changes in mobility on published counts of confirmed COVID-19 
cases or deaths. Although such analyses are of critical importance, they are 
complicated by the heterogeneous availability of testing, delays in reporting, and the 
inherent latency before social distancing impacts are evident in clinical outcomes, and 
thus beyond the scope of this report. 
 
 In summary, using anonymized, aggregated, and differentially private data from Google 
users who opted in to Location History, we found that state-mandated social distancing 
orders were effective in decreasing time spent away from places of residence, as well 
as reducing visits to work, and visits to both grocery stores/pharmacies and 
retail/recreational locations. While the majority of states declared states of emergency 
by early March, the emergency declaration ​per se​ had only a modest effect on mobility. 
In contrast, implementation of one or more specific social distancing orders was 
associated with an almost ​25% additional reduction​ in time spent away from places of 
residence and a ​33% additional reduction​ in visits to retail and recreational locations. 
These effects were evident in every state and in virtually every county. Although we 
were unable to estimate the independent effects of different social distancing measures 
due to their close temporal proximity within each state, we did observe that those states 
that implemented multiple such measures experienced more pronounced declines in 
mobility. In addition, limits on bars and restaurants appeared to be the single most 
effective social distancing order.  
 
We conclude that state-based orders intended to promote social distancing appear to 
be very effective in accomplishing the public health goals of encouraging individuals to 
stay at home in order to minimize the risk of COVID-19 transmission. Our findings not 
only illustrate the importance of specific social distancing orders, but also demonstrate 
the magnitude of change in mobility that we might expect from these policies. This 
information can help public health officials better calibrate and understand the extent to 
which social distancing can slow down the disease.  
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Data and Materials Availability:​ The anonymized and aggregated dataset analyzed 
herein was the same one that was used to create the publicly-available Google 
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports (published at ​http://google.com/covid19/mobility 
on April 2, 2020). The data analyzed in this paper consisted of anonymized, 
aggregated, and differentially private counts of visits to places in different categories. 
The publicly available data reflects percentage ratios computed using these counts. The 
information on dates of policy interventions was aggregated from publicly available data 
as described in the Supplemental Material.  
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Supplementary Materials 
 
Methods and Materials  
Our overall approach was to use regression discontinuity using each county’s recent 
past as its own control to assess the impact of state declarations of emergency and 
targeted social distancing policies on the relative changes in the average time spent 
away from places of residence, the number of visits to work, and the number of visits to: 
1) grocery stores and pharmacies, 2) retail stores, recreational sites, and eateries, 3) 
transit stops, and 4) parks. 
 
Data on state social distancing policies were obtained from official documents issued by 
state governors and health and education officials. Documents were linked from the 
Kaiser Family Foundation’s State Data and Policy Actions Tracker (11) and 
supplemented with manual searches of state public health websites. Dates of policy 
enactment were cross-checked with the AEI COVID-19 Action Tracker (12) and the 
NYTimes Shelter in Place Tracker (13). Policies tracked were categorized as follows: 1) 
state-declared state of emergency, 2) state-mandated school closures, 3) 
state-mandated closing of non-essential businesses and services, 4) state-mandated 
limits on large gatherings, 5) state-imposed bans on in-restaurant service, and 6) 
state-imposed mandatory quarantines. State-mandated closing of non-essential 
businesses included any order closing gyms, theaters, and other businesses even if it 
did not extend to all non-essential businesses. Limits on large gatherings referred to any 
ban on gatherings larger than a certain number of people, though that threshold varied 
between states. For states that issued additional orders reducing the size of permitted 
gatherings, the date of the first such order was taken. Bans on in-restaurant service 
excluded mandatory reductions in restaurant capacity and included only those orders 
that prohibited any restaurant activity except pick-up and delivery. These bans often 
also included bars and clubs. Mandatory quarantine referred to any stay-at-home or 
shelter-in-place order that prohibited non-essential travel away from the home for all 
residents. Shelter-in-place orders specifically for high-risk individuals were excluded. 
Orders that went into effect at any time after 12:00 pm were considered to begin on the 
following day. 
 
 We obtained aggregated and anonymized data from groups of Google users on mobile 
devices in all 50 states and Washington, DC who have opted in to having their Location 
History data stored. The anonymized dataset used for these analyses is the same as 
the one used to create the publicly-available Google COVID-19 Community Mobility 
Reports (published at ​http://google.com/covid19/mobility​ on April 2, 2020). The 
aggregation and anonymization process applied to the initial version of Google 
COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports has been previously described in detail.(8) The 
Community Mobility Reports leverage signals such as relative frequency, time and 
duration of visits to calculate metrics related to places of residence and places of work 
of Location History users as described elsewhere.(8) The anonymization process is 
designed to ensure that no personal data, including an individual’s location, movement, 
or contacts, can be derived from the resulting metrics. 
 
Data were aggregated to the county level (and Washington, DC) and available daily 
from January 1 through March 29, 2020.  Within each county we applied a regression 
discontinuity analysis to estimate the relative change in time spent away from the place 
of residence (primary outcome) and the relative change in the number of visits to public 
locations (secondary outcomes) associated with: 1) declaration of a state of emergency, 
2) ordering of one or more social distancing measures, and 3) orders for people to 
shelter-in-place. 
 
We note that less populous counties are more likely to have days with missing data for 
visits to one or more categories of places (e.g., pharmacies) due to privacy filtering and 
other technical aspects. However, we believe that missing data has negligible effects on 
the state and national estimates provided because: 1) state level estimates are 
weighted by county population, and populous counties are extremely unlikely to have 
any metrics which fall below the limits of detection, and 2) the (unweighted) correlations 
between the relative changes in the combined metrics used in this paper (e.g., grocery 
stores and pharmacies considered together), compared to an unbiased, but 
lower-coverage alternative (e.g., grocery stores only) are very high (>0.95).  
 
For each county we compared the value of each metric in the week after the date of 
implementation versus the 7-day period 9 to 2 days prior to the date of implementation. 
We included a two-day washout period prior to the implementation date given the public 
messaging that typically precedes implementation of these orders. Given data until 
March 29 were available, the effects of policies enacted on or before March 23 could be 
evaluated. The state level estimates reflect population-weighted aggregates of the 
county-specific estimates. The national estimates are a simple average of the state 
estimates. 
  
Because each county and state is compared to its recent past these estimates are 
causally interpretable. However, comparisons across counties or states are only 
descriptive since locations can differ substantially in terms of the proportion of the 
population opted-in to Location History; the demographics of this group; the quality of 
the mobility data and of the Google Maps data about local establishments; and a 
number of other factors that may influence the observed changes in mobility beyond 
differences in the policy environment.  
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
We performed a sensitivity analysis to assess the distribution of each outcome metric 
under the null hypothesis of the policies having no effect.  We interpret the relative 
change across two periods of time (period 1: January 27-February 2, 2020; period 2: 
February 5-11, 2020), prior to the enactment of any state-level social distancing 
measures, as observations under the null hypothesis. During this time there were only 5 
reported cases of COVID-19 in the U.S., which were isolated in Washington state. 
Although there was a small drop in time spent away from the place of residence across 
these pre-intervention periods, the much larger effects on mobility observed after each 
of the policies suggests that our observed effect during the exposure period is in fact 
related to the implementation of social distancing (​Supplement Figure 2​).  
 
Supplemental Figures 2.A and 2.B​ can be compared to Figures 2 and 3 in the main 
text to gain a sense of how different these effects look when the first social-distancing 
measures were implemented. Under the null hypothesis of no policy-affect, the median 
observed change is slightly below -2%. However, during the first social-distancing 
measures, the median drop is nearly 10 times as large at -19%. For further context, all 
but two counties during the first social-distancing measures are below the null 
distribution median, and over 96% of counties are below the null distribution 2.5% 
percentile. A comparison between the changes in mobility during first social-distancing 
measures and changes in mobility under the null hypothesis for each metric is 
presented in ​Supplemental Tables 2.A and 2.B​. 
 
Our main analyses estimate the incremental mobility changes after versus before each 
of three waves of policy orders (Figure 2). However, it is also of interest to quantify the 
overall effect of social distancing by comparing mobility at the end versus the start of 
March. We define the overall effect as the change in mobility from the week before the 
term “social distancing” started increasing in Google Search (March 1-7th) to the last 
 week available in the data (March 23-29th). We see a significant decrease in all metrics. 
The ordering of the magnitudes is comparable to those in Figure 2B. As expected the 
overall magnitudes of the drops are larger than any of the incremental effects in Figure 
2.  
  
 Supplemental Table 1​: ANOVA sum of squares decomposition of the variation in the 
relative change on average time spent away from places of residence across counties 
for the linear model with the relative pre-post difference in time spent away from the 
residence as the outcome and state as the only independent variable. The results show 
that approximately half of the variance in the outcome is explained by differences 
between states and the remaining variance is largely explained by differences across 
counties within states.  
 
 
Sums of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom F statistic P value 
% of variance 
explained by each 
source 
State 5.48 49 55.24 < 0.0001 49.76% 
Residual 5.53 2733   50.24% 
Total 11.01 2782    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Supplemental Figure 1​: Effect of first social distancing order on visits to places of work 
(A)​, visits to grocery stores and pharmacies ​(B)​, visits to retail, recreation, and eateries 
(C)​, visits to transit stops ​(D)​, and visits to parks ​(E)​.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
 Supplemental Table 2.A​: Relative changes in national averages from January 
27-February 2, 2020 to February 5-11, 2020 for all metrics of interest. Since these 
periods occurred before any orders were issued, we interpret these changes as 
observations under the null hypothesis of no policy effect.  Although most metrics show 
a statistically significant decrease, the magnitude of the effect is considerably smaller 
compared with the policy intervention effects. The effect of the first social distancing 
order on time spent away from places of residence is ~12x larger. Similar differences 
are observed for the other metrics, ranging from ~2x to ~90x for Parks and Transit, 
respectively. The same reference null distribution can be used for the effects of the 
other two waves (i.e., emergency declaration and shelter in place). 
 
 Effect of 1st SD Order Pseudo Effect  
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Ratio of estimates 
Time Spent Away 
from Residences -24.47% 0.10% -2.10% 0.11% 11.64 
Visits to Grocery & 
Pharmacy -9.27% 0.12% -1.43% 0.14% 6.46 
Visits to Parks -10.54% 0.41% -5.96% 0.50% 1.77 
Visits to Retail & 
Recreation -33.04% 0.12% -0.66% 0.14% 49.75 
Visits to Transit 
Stops -22.43% 0.15% -0.25% 0.18% 89.58 
Visits to 
Workplaces -27.92% 0.21% -1.16% 0.23% 24.16 
 
  
 Supplemental Table 2.B​: Distribution of relative changes across counties for metrics 
from January 27-February 2, 2020 to February 5-11, 2020 compared to the analogous 
distributions during the first social distancing measures. This table depicts the 
heterogeneity of the changes before any orders were issued and are interpreted as 
observations under the null hypothesis of no policy effect. In this table, we see that all 
the medians for the first social distancing measure are substantially lower than the 
medians under the null. Furthermore, the spread of the effects for the first social 
distancing measure is larger (e.g., for workplace visits the 90% range is 26 percentual 
points during the treatment period vs 10 percentual points under the null). The same 
reference null distribution can be used for the effects of the other two waves of policy 
interventions. 
 
 First SD measures Before any order 
 5 %ile 25 %ile 50 %ile 75 %ile 95 %ile 5% il​e 25 %ile 50 %ile 75 %ile 95 %ile 
Time Spent 
Away from 
Residences -31% -23% -19% -15% -10% -8% -4% -2% -1% 1% 
Visits to 
Retail & 
Recreation -48% -37% -30% -24% -12% -10% -4% -1% 1% 6% 
Visits to 
Workplaces -35% -26% -21% -16% -9% -8% -3% -1% 0% 2% 
Visits to 
Transit 
Stops -42% -26% -17% -9% 1% -9% -3% 0% 2% 9% 
Visits to 
Parks -37% -22% -10% 3% 30% -26% -14% -6% 2% 19% 
Visits to 
Grocery & 
Pharmacy -22% -13% -6% 1% 13% -7% -3% -1% 1% 7% 
 
 
  
 Supplemental Figure 2.A ​Relative changes in national averages from January 
27-February 2, 2020 to February 5-11, 2020 for all metrics of interest. The results are 
also shown in Supplemental Table 2.A. This plot can serve as a reference point for 
Figure 2 in the sense that these periods occurred before any orders were issued and 
can be interpreted as observations under the null hypothesis of no effect of policy 
interventions​. 
 
  
 Supplemental Figure 2.B​: Relative changes in county averages from January 
27-February 2, 2020 to February 5-11, 2020 for time spent away from the residence. 
Counties are grouped by state to show the heterogeneity across counties and states 
before any orders were issued.  The changes can be interpreted as observations under 
the null hypothesis of no policy effect because these periods occurred before any orders 
were issued 
 
 
  
 Supplemental Figure 3: ​Results from Google Trends (trends.google.com) showing 
relative frequency of searches for “Social Distancing” as a topic in the United States, 
Feb 1-April 8, 2020 ​(A)​ and​ ​overall average national​ ​effects of social distancing orders 
relative to period prior to social distancing awareness (March 1-7, 2020) as suggested 
by Google Trends ​(B).  
 
      
 
  
 Supplemental Figure 4: ​Timeline of change in average time spent away from places of 
residence in King County, Washington (i.e. Seattle area) (A), Westchester County, New 
York (B), New York County, New York (i.e., Manhattan) (C), and Santa Clara County, 
California (i.e. San Jose area). Colored boxes denote the declaration of a state of 
emergency, the implementation of the first county-level social distancing order, the 
implementation of the first state-level social distancing order, and county and/or 
state-level orders for residents to shelter in place. The height of each box corresponds 
to the change in average time Location History users spent away from places of 
residence in the week before (plus a 2-day washout period) versus the week after each 
policy date.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
